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Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein [1972] have proved a well-known 
impossibility theorem for acyclic social preference. They showed 
that if social preference is acyclic for each configuration of individual 
preferences, and if the mapping between individual and social pref­
erences satisfies the Pareto axiom, the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, and May's positive responsiveness axiom, then there 
must be an ind_ividual i such that for any x and y, xP,y � xRy. This 
l 
individual might be considered a "vetoer, 11 
Bordes (1974] and Sen [1975) have noted, that Mas-Collel and 
Sonnens chein actually proved a stronger result than the one they stated, 
One way of stating this result is as follows: any mapping that takes 
each configuration of individual preferences into a complete, reflexive 
social preference relation that has no strict preference cycles of length 
three in such a way that the Pareto axiom, May's positive responsive­
ness axiom, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives are satisfied
must necessarily have the property that a vetoer exists, In other 
words the requirement that social preference be acyclic is not neces­
sary to obtain impossibility results of the sort reported by Mas-Collel 
and Sonnens chein, 
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While the Mas -Coll el Sonnenschein theorem is familiar to 
most scholars in the field, it is considered by some to be of limited 
significance due to its use of May's positive responsiveness axiom. 
The authors themselves remark that "As stated, the condition is 
very strong and perhaps so�ewhat unappealing" (19721 p. 101 ]. 
Indeed it is. The positive responsiveness condition requires that if 
for a given preference configuration society is indifferent between 
a pair of alternatives, then if one person in his preferences raises 
one of the alternatives relative to the other and everyone else's 
preferences with respect to that pair remain the same, society 
switches to strict preference. Mas -Coll el and Sonnenschein go on to 
remark that PR is employed to exclude the admissibility of what they 
call "degenerate" social preference functions, e.g. unanimity :rules. 
In this paper we produce a class of impossibility results 
that are related in spir1t to those obtained by Mas -Collel and 
Sonnenschein. In particular we demonstrate that there is an ines­
capable conflict between consistent social preference or choice and 
the requirement that no individuals in society be "too" powerful. 
In section I we show that if social choice is acyclic, it cannot satisfy 
some relatively weak conditions designed to ensure that power not be 
too narrowly held. In section II we introduce a class of axioms restrict­
ing the social choice function and show that various conditions prohibit­
ing the concentration of power cannot be simultaneously satisfied. 
Finally, in section III we show that a Mas-Collel Sonnenschein type 
theorem is available even when the rationality condition is greatly 
weakened. 
Society is a set of n individuals having a preference relation 
Ri which is a weak order on X, the finite set of possibl� social states.
The social choice from a set V where V is a subset of X is denoted 
C(V, R1, R2,. ••,Rn) or C(V) where the dependence on the preference
of the individuals is unambiguous, C(V) is assumed to be nonempty 
and contained in V. We utilize the following standard definitions. 
P(Pareto Principle): A i  xP, y => (x} = C (  (x, y} ). l 
! (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): Let (R1, • • • , Rn) and
(Rl, • • .  , R�) be two sets of individual preferences. VV c X if 
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Vx,y EV, Vi xR.y ¢=> xR!y, then C (V, R1, • • •  , R ) = C)V, R11, • • •  , R' ),l i n n 
N(Neutrality): 
Vx,y, z,w EX: [ (Vi : xR,y <==> zR!w) and (Vi :yR.x <==> wR!z)] => l l l l 
[ (x E C ((x,y}, R1, • • •  ,Rn)� z E C ((z,w}, Rl'''''RZ)) and
(y E C((x,y}, R1,R2, .. . ,Rn) <==>w E C(fz,w}, Rl, ... ,R�))].
We shall (somewhat loosely) say that a choice function is acyclic if 
and only if it has an acyclic rationalization, that is VV ::, X, 
V(R1, • • •  , Rn)' :!fR Ea such that¢# C(V, R1, • • •  , Rn) = fx :x E V,
xRy, Vy E v·} where a is the set of acyclic relations on X. 
I. A SIMPLE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
In this section we propose a new axiom that excludes "degen-
erate 11 social preference functions and then prove a new impossibility 
theorem. Unlike the Mas-Collel Sonnenschein theorem which requires 
only that social choice be acyclic on a triple of alternatives, we shall 
use the full strength of the acyclicity condition, On the oth�r hand, 
we shall be able to obtain our impossibility results without the imposi-
tion of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. 
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Axiom l (k): Vx, y E X and for each subset c of individuals such that 
I c I .:::_ k where k is a positive integer, 
(Vi E c, xP,y and Vj � c, yP.x) => (y} = C((x,y}). l 
' 
J 
We may now prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: If IX I ?_ �n ?_ 3, there is no ·choice
. 
function C(
satisfying axiom l (k) and acyclicity. 
Proof: There exist integers t and r such that n = .(, • k + r, 0 < r < k. 
Society may be partitioned into J subsets c. such that I c. I < k where 
J J 
J=tif r=O 
= .i + l if r > O. 
Suppose we have the following preference configuration: 
C((x1,x2}), (x2} = C((x2,x3}), .. ., (
xJ_1} = C
((xJ-l'xJ})
c (fx 
J
' x
l} ).
The requirement that C( fx1, • • •  , x3}) be nonempty contradicts the
assumption that C( ) is acyclic. 
Q.E.D. 
Note that for k = 1 the axiom we are using is a slight strengthening 
of the Mas-Collel Sonnenschein requirement that there be no weak 
dictator-D. They formulate their axiom as follows: 
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NWD -D.: Vi, for some x,y EX, (xPiy and yPjx, vr# i), arid [y} = C((x,y}).
In fact we have the following corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary:. If jxj � n � 3, there is no choice function satisfying NWD-D,
neutrality and acyclicity. 
Proof: NWD-D says that for each i there is an x, y E X such that 
( xP,y and yP.x, j # i) and (y} = C( [x, y} ). Neutrality ensures. thatl J 
Axiom 1 ( 1) holds, thus satisfying all the conditions of Theorem 1.
Q.E.D. 
A number of similar results have appeared in the literature. For 
example, theorem 1, which is closely related to results reported 
in Ferejohn and Grether [1974], shows that as the requirement that 
power not be narrowly held is strengthened, the number of alternatives 
society must have before it in order to obtain an impossibility theorem 
is reduced, 
II. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS 
FOR NONRA TIONAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
Following work by Sen [1971 ], Ferejohn and Grether [1975 ],
and others, we report here some in;ipossibility theorems for social 
choice functions which do not satisfy a rationality condition. Numerous 
authors have produced axiomatizations of rationality. We will produce 
a class of axioms that are similar i.n spirit to ones introduced by Sen 
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' [1971]. Sen [1975] proved that the following two axioms together are 
equivalent to rationality ( acyclicity). 
a.2: x·E C(V) => x E C(fx,y}), Vy EV, 
y2: x E C([x,y}), Vy EV => x E C(V). 
It is easy to show that if C satisfies a.2, then the relation R defined as 
xRy <:;=:=> x E C( { x, y}) is acyclic, Indeed,. the following axiom is
sufficient for the acyclicity of R: 
a.-: VV � X, :ifx E C(V) such that x E.C((x,y}), Vy EV. 
Clearly, if R is interpreted as the social preference relation, 
we can obtain strengthenings of many previously proved impossibility 
theorems. For example, Sen Showed that if a social choice procedure 
satisfies the Pareto axiom, independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
May's positive responsiveness, and axiom a.-, then there must be a 
vetoer. Natural strengthenings of our results in section I may be 
obtained straightforwardly. 
Here we introduce another set of axioms that relate naturally 
to Sen1s a.-. 
a.(k): VV c X such that jvj < k. !ifx E C(V) such that x E C((x,y}),
Vy EV. 
Notice that a.- = U a.(k) and a.(k) => a.(k-1 ), We can also demonstrate the 
k 
following result, 
Lemma 1: If C satisfies a.(k), then R has no strict preference cycles 
of length k or shorter. 
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Proof: Suppose there is a k-cycle over the elements [x1 , x2, • . .  , xn}.
Then [x1} = C( [x1 , x2}), [x2} = C( [x2, x3}), ... , [xk-l} = C( [xk-l'xk})
and [xk} = C( [xk' x1 } ). Notice that there is no element z in
C( [x1 , x2, • • •  , xk}) with the property that z E C( (xi' z } ), Vi = 1, , ., ,  k.
Thus a.(k) requires C( (x1 , • • .  , xn}) to be empty.
Q.E.D. 
We note that a.( 3) is the a.-- axiom introduced by Sen and that it is 
the weakest axiom in the family; that we are studying,
Our primary interest now is in obtaining a class of the.orems 
which indicate the relation between thiS nested family of consistency 
axioms and the family of axioms governing the distribution of power 
introduced in section I. In particular we will show the following. 
Theorem 2: if IX  I > i�• then if C satisfies a.(k), it cannot satisfy
axiom 1 (.(,) when n = ( k  - 1 ).(, + p and p < .(,, 
Proof: Suppose axiom 1 ( .(,) is satisfied, Then, using the construction 
in the proof of theorem 1 � we can find a configuration for which there 
is a k-cycle. 
O.E.D. 
Theorem 2 indicates exactly how increasing the strength of 
a rationality requirement ( i.e. letting k increase) allows us to obtain 
stronger impossibility results ( in the sense that axiom 1(.(,) becomes 
less restrictive as .(, decreases). 
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III. A N  IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR NONBINARY CHOICE
In common with most theorems in the literature the results 
given above depend upon the behavior of the social choice function on 
the two-element subsets of X. In this section we investigate the possi­
bility of obtaining related results when the social choice funceion does 
not operate on such small subsets. 
It will be noted that the essential feature of Sen1s a. type 
axioms is that at least some of the elements chosen in a large set be 
chosen as well in certain small subsets. In particular, a.2, a. -, and 
a.( k) require that the small subsets in question be the pairs. Here we 
require that some element that is chosen in a large set is chosen in 
all .(,-element subsets of that set. We propose the following axiom: 
A ( t): For each Tc X, I Tl > .(,, :B:x E C(T) such that x E C( S), VS c T 
such that IS I = .(, , 
It will be seen that we do not restrict the behavior of the choice function 
on the small sets and in fact do not require that the choice function even 
be defined on sets with fewer than .(, elements. 
We will show that a choice function cannot satisfy A ( .(,) and a 
fairly natural nonbinary axiom requiring that power not be held too 
narrowly. We propose the following axiom requiring that choice be 
weakly democratic, 
WD(k, .(,): Vx, y E X and V c, such that I c I < k, if xP,y, Vi E c- l 
and yP.x, Vj � c, then VS� X, Isl ::::, .(,, y E S ==> x f. C( S). 
J 
This axiom requires that for large sets ( those with at I.east .(, elements), 
coalitions with fewer than k people cannot force a desired element into 
the choice set. 
We may now establish the following theorem: 
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1 . Theorem 3: If k,f, � n and !xi .:::_kn, C cannot satisfy A(,£,) and WD(k, ,£,),
Proof: Suppose kt � n. Then n = mk + r, 0 < r < k and we can 
divide society into M subsets I c. I < k, i = 1 , 2, . • .  , M, where M = m, 
1 -
r = 0, or M = m + 1 , r > 0, M > ,£,, Consider the following con -
figuration: 
c l CZ .c3 CM
xl x2 X3· XM
x2 x3 x4 xl
x2
Note that since I {x1 , x2, • • .  , xM} I > ,£,, A(,£,) requires that
xj E C( (x�, xi,, , , ,  xM}) and that xj be contained in all ,£,-element
s:ubsets of {x1 ,x2,, , ,  ,xM}. Consider an ,£, -element subset, S,
containing x. and x. 1 • Note that x.P.x. 1 < > i E c. and x, 1 P.x.,J J- J 1 J- J J- l J 
Vi f. c.. Thus x, f. C(S) by WD(k, .(.), 
J J 
Q.E.D. 
It is of some interest to note that the structure of the proof 
of theorem 3 is identical to that of theorems 1 and 2, in spite of the 
fact that theorem 3 is established in a nonbinary setup. The reason 
for this is that A (t) is sufficient to ensure that the following, binary 
relations have no Pt-cycles of length greater than.(. - 1 . xR.(,y <=> 
:3: S c X, IS I = ,£,with x E C(S), y E S. It should be noted that R2 ,is
1 0 
simply Sen1s "base relation," and that his a- axiom guarantees its 
acyclicity. For completeness we give the following example that 
indicates that while A(,£,) precludes Pt-cycles longer than .(, - 1 , it 
does not rule out cycles of length ,£, - l, 
Exam:ele: x = {x1 ,x2,x3,w, z}
{w, z} = C( {x1 , x2, x3, w, z})
{w} C( {x1 , x2, x3, w} )
{z} C( {x1 , x2, x3, z})
{x1 ,w} = C((x1 ,x2,w, z})
{�2,w} = C([x2'.x3,w, z})
{x3,w} C({x1 ,x3,w, z})
IV, DISCUSSION 
We think that the results given here help clarify the relation­
ship between the consistency of social choice and the requirement that 
the distribution of power in society should not be too unequal. Of 
course it is this relationship that is at the core of the theory of social 
choice, but the classical results of A rrow [1 963], Sen [1 971 ], and 
Brown [1 974) have demonstrated impossibility results in only a small 
fraction of cases. Fur�nermore the consistency axioms employed in 
these works are quite strong. In this paper we have examined a number 
of consistency conditions, weaker than those found in the classical 
papers, and a range of axioms governing the distribution of power. 
It was found, not surprisingly in view of earlier results, that the more 
egalitarian society is required to be, the less consistent it can be. 
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The theorems of Arrow, Sen, and Brown tell us exactly what 
the power structure of society must look like if we require that social 
preference be a weak order, quasi-transitive, or acyclic, respectively. 
We have given analogous results for social choice functions that satisfy 
a weaker family of consistency requirements. In this case the power 
structure is not necessarily oligarchic but, as in the case of Sen1s 
and Brown's theorems, either some small group is vested with p�wer 
or else social choice is indecisive. 
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